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IN THE SUPREM.E co~URT 
of the 
STATE· OF UIT AH 
FIREMEN'S INSURAN·C·E C 0 M -




Plaintiff, Case No. 
10240 




S·TAT·E·MENT· OF F ACTiS 
STAT·E;MENT· OF THE KIND OF ·C:ASE 
This is an action for recovery of a subrogation claim 
paid by and assigned to the plaintiff, arising out of a 
collision where the automobile of the plaintiff's assured 
(Ivan Johnson) was damaged and the insured Mr. John-
son was injured when an automobile owned by one de-
fendant and driven by the other skidded onto the wrong 
side of the highway. 
DiSP·O·SITIO·N IN LOWER CO~URT 
The case was tried before the trial judge. From a 
judgment of no cause of action bas<·d on a finding that 
no negligence of defendant proxiinately caused the acci-
dent, plaintiff appeals. 
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2 
REL,IEF SOUGHT ON AP'PEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment, and judg-
ment in its favor as a matter of lavv·, or that failing, a 
new trial. 
The accident occurred December 27, 1960, on Sunny-
side Avenue in Salt L·ake :City about 140 feet west of 
Padley Street, where Sunnyside runs east and west with 
private residences on the south and Fort Douglas on the 
north. The roads were dry, the weather was clear, and 
the visibility was good. Phillip Gordon, driving the auto~ 
mobile of Neil Gordon was traveling west on Sunnyside 
Avenue traveling 50 to 60 miles per hour, one and one-
half car lengths behind a second car. Phillip Gordon 
failed to notice until it was too late for him to stop, that 
a third west-bound car had stopped to turn left at Padley 
Street, which interseets Sunnyside from the south. ·Tra-
veling too fast to stop or slow down sufficiently, follow-
ing to close behind the second car, and failing to observe 
the third car sufficiently early, Phillip Gordon swerved 
to the right onto the shoulder where he traveled some 
distance before his car skidded sidewards back across 
the west bound lane, across the center line, and still 
skidding sidewards in the east bound lane, struck with 
the side of defendant's car the front end of Ivan John-
son's vehicle which was facing east in the east bound 
lane. I van Johnson had been traveling less than 30 miles 
per hour and braked sufficiently to be almost stopped 
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3 
at the time he was struck. The impact knocked Johnson 
approxirnately nine feet to the south. The record con-
tains no indication of any negligence by Johnson. 
At the time of the accident Phillip L. Gordon was 
using the automobile of Neil Gordon with gasoline fur-
nished by Neil Gordon for the purpose of going to P·ark 
City and bringing Neil Gordon's girl friend to Salt Lake 
City to meet Neil Gordon about 5:00 P.~1. when he got 
off work so that Neil Gordon and the girl friend could 
keep a social engagement. (Deposition of Neil Gordon, 
Pages 3 and 11, D:eposition of Phillip Gordon, P'ages 4 
and 5.) Phillip L. Gordon was married at the time, but 
his brother Neil Gordon was unmarried. Phillip L. 
Gordon did not have a license and never had had one 
when Neil Gordon entrusted him with the automobile. 
(Record 72, 74 and Etxhihit P-11.) 
At the time of the collision Phillip L. Gordon did not 
have and never had had a driver's license (record 72). 
Phillip Gordon was driving westward and slightly down-
hill on Sunnyside Avenue at 50 to 60 miles pe-r hour 
(record 72-73). At that point Sunnyside Avenue has a 
residential neighborhood to the south and a military 
reservation to the north. Phillip Gordon believed the 
speed limit to be 30 or 40 miles per hour (Phillip Gordon 
Deposition, Page 6, Line 7). Phillip Gordon drove 50 to 
60 miles per hour as he was following another car at one 
and one-half car lengths distance (Exhibit P-11, P·age 2; 
Neil Gordon Deposition, Page 12, Line 11). Although the 
visibility was good Phillip Gordon failed to obse-rve until 
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4 
too late a third car stop to turn south on Padley Street 
(Record 66; D:eposition of Phillip Gordon, page 7, lines 
6-13; page 15, L,ine 17, page 6, Lines 11-15). Phillip had 
good brakes and applied them (Deposition of Phillip 
Gordon, page 15, line 23, page 17, line 25). 
The car ahead of defendant Gordon turned around 
the car waiting for the turn. Defendant Gordon was 
going too fast to stop and swerved to the right to avoid 
the stopped car and plowed furrows in the shoulder for 
a considerable distance (Record 75, 76, 79). Phillip Gor-
don failed to keep control of the car and skidded in a 
southwesterly direction vvith the car traveling in a side-
ways fashion rather than rolling forward. As the skid-
ding car made a curving path across the west bound lane, 
across the center of the highway into the east bound lane, 
it still had a momentum of 25-30 miles per hour (record 
72,, 73, 76, 77, Exhibit P-7, Deposition of Phillip Gordon, 
page 8, line 8, page 14, line 20, page 10, line 20). Phillip 
Gordon did not see the Johnson car until it was 30 or 
40 feet away (Deposition of Phillip Gordon, page 9, line 
26). The right side of the defendants' car struck the 
front of the Johnson vehicle knocking the Johnson 
vehicle slightly back and forcing the front end of the 
Johnson car nine feet to the south ahnost at right angles 
(Record 68). Both autos "\vere extensively damaged. 
The investigating officer determined the probable 
point of impact by means of the right angle veering to 
the south as the front wheels of the Johnson vehicle were 
forced to skid sidewards. Point of imp-act was 140 feet 
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·west of Padley Street and six feet south of the center 
line of Sunnyside A venue (the east bound lane was 15 
feet wide and the probable point of impact was nine feet 
north of the south edge of Sunnyside) (Record 69, 70). 
The defendants' car stopped facing east in the southern 
half of the road (Exhibit P-7). 
The Johnson car left 30 feet of skid marks in the 
east bound lane. The officer estimated the speed of 
Johnson to have been less than 30 miles per hour before 
the emergency, and also estimated the Johnson car to 
have been stopped or almost stopped when hit by the 
defendant and forced to the south (Record 76). Phillip 
Gordon did not complain of or suggest that there was 
any negligence on Johnson's part at the time of the 
police investigation, at the time he signed a written state-
ment for the adjuster (Exhibit p·-11) or at the taking of 
his deposition. Phillip Gordon in his deposition denied 
any knowledge of any improper driving by Johnson 
(Deposition of Phillip Gordon, page 17, line 7). 
Salt Lake City Police Officer Oscar J. Hendrickson 
investigated. He measured 30 feet seven inches of skid 
marks proceeding due east in the eastbound lane of 
Sunnyside Avenue made by the .Johnson vehicle, and 
leading to the point of impact, where the front wheels 
then skidded abruptly at right angles and veered south 
nine feet (Record 68, 69). The officer observed that the 
defendant car had plowed furrows for sorne distance in 
the shoulder at the north sid<} of NunnysidP Avenue 
(Record 70, Line 17), and that the defendant car skidd<}d 
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on the hard surface in a curving line southwesterly across 
the westbound lane of Sunnyside and part of the east-
bound lane of Sunnyside leaving skid marks of 63 feet 
8 inches with the left front wheel and 40 feet 8 inches 
with the left rear wheel (Record 70). D'efendant struck 
Johnson 6 feet south of the center line of Sunnyside 
(Record 70). Defendant Phillip Gordon stated his ver-
sion of the accident to the investigating officer and the 
officer recorded Phillip Gordon's version in his notes as 
follows: "I came· west on Sunnyside A venue from Immi-
gration Canyon, approaching 2200 East, following 
another car. The car ahead of me swerved to the left 
around a stopped car. I went around the right side to 
avoid the stopped ear and hit the soft dirt and skidded 
sideways down the road and was hit by another car. 
Estimate of speed approaching the accident scene, 50 or 
60 miles per hour. Estin1ate of speed at the time of the 
collision, 30 miles per hour (Record 72 and 73). 
I van Johnson was too badly injured in the accident 
to be interviewed by the officer (Record 73, 74). 
The officer's diagram was admitted as Exhibit P-7, 
with the vehicles located as he found them, the defendant 
vehicle as No. 1 and Johnson as No. 2 (Record 66, 67). 
Shortly after the accident defendant Phillip Gordon 
gave to Mr. Severe, adjuster for ·Crawford & Company, 
a statement which 'vas reduced in writing and read and 
approved and signed by Phillip Gordon. A copy was 
admitted as E.xhibit P-11 (Record 101, 103, 105). 
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Damages were found by the trial court to be as 
alleged and testified by plaintiff (Record 271 Findings of 
Fact, Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8). 
I van Johnson was alert, energetic, and fully active 
before his injury, making about $27,000.00 a year (Rec-
ord 90). He was incapacitated by his injuries and his 
income fell off drastically (R.ecord 91, and 9'2) and he 
never regained his formed state of health or earning 
capacity. (Mr. Johnson died before the time of trial of 
causes other than his injuries). Mr. Johnson retained 
counsel and claimed not only property damages but pay-
ment unde-r the "Uninsured Motorist 'C'overage" provi-
sion of his policy with plaintiff. 
Johnson's vehicle was damaged in the sum of $860.72., 
of which plaintiff paid $810.72. Prior to payment Mr. 
Severe, an adjuster, took reasonable precautions to ac-
complish the repairs at the lowest price· (E\xhihit P -2; 
Exhibit P-5; Record 46, 47, 95, 96 and 97; Deposition of 
Neil Gordon, page 9, line 2). 
Mter prolonged negotiation with Ivan Johnson and 
his attorney the plaintiff paid Johnson $5,000.00 for his 
damages arising out of personal injury, and as subrogee 
under the policy, took the assignment of Mr. Johnson's 
claim against the defendants (Exhibit P'-3; Exhibit P-6; 
Record48, 50, 60, 61, 62, 65). 
A copy of Johnson's insurance policy was admitted 
as Exhibit P -1. 
The trial court in its memorandurn decision denied 
recovery for the reasons set forth in Paragraph 4, 
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Memorandum Decision (R.ecord 23), as follows: urrhe 
Court has carefully considered the testimony adduced in 
open court, together with the depositions of the defend-
ants, and although it may appear from the depositions 
and the evidence that the defendant, Phillip L. Gordon, 
may have been negligent prior to the accident in question 
that negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident 
in question, and the Court, therefore, finds and concludes 
that Phillip L. Gordon was not negligent in any of the 
manners set forth in the P'retrial Order or in any other 
manner, and that the case should therefore be dismissed."· 
POINT ONE. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, THE CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN OMIT-
TING TO FIND NEGLIGENCE BY PHILLIP GORDON; 
PHILLIP GORDON WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
The evidence, credible and undisputed, shows that 
Phillip Gordon breached his duties as a driver in several 
respects. He did not come up to the standard of care of 
a reasonable prudent driver under the circumstances 
with respect to several duties of a driver which are so 
well established and familiar that they are embodied in 
standard instructions to juries: 
Duty to use reasonable care to keep a lookout for 
other vehicles, obstacles, or other conditions reasonably 
to be anticipated. JIFU, 21.1A 
Duty to keep his car und~r reasonably safe and 
1)roper control. JIF,U 21.1B 
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Duty to drive at such a speed as was safe, reason-
able and prudent under the circumstances, having due 
regard to the width, surface and condition of the high-
way, the traffic thereon, the visibility and any actual or 
potential hazards then existing. JIFU, 21.1C 
Duty not to follow another vehicle more closely than 
is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for his own 
speed, the speed of such other vehicle, other traffic upon 
the highway, and all other conditions there existing, and 
to keep at such a distance and maintain such control of 
his automobile as is reasonable and prudent for the 
safety of himself and other. JIFU, 21.1D 
Duty to drive his automobile on his own right side 
of the highway, JIFU, 21.1G, 41-6-53 UCA, 1953. 
Duty not to attempt to pass another vehicle until he 
1nakes observation and ascertains that this can be done 
with reasonable safety under the circumstances. JIFlT, 
21.1H, 41-6-55 uc,A, 1953. 
Duty to attempt to overtake and pass another vehicle 
upon the right only under conditions permitting such 
movement in safety and in no event to attempt such 
movement by driving off the pavement or main traveled 
portion of the roadway. 41-6-56, Subsection (h), UCA. 
1953. 
POINT TWO. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND JUDGMENT ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
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THE ACCIDENT WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF PHILLIP 
GORDON; AS A MATTER OF LAW THE NEGLIGENCE OF 
PHILLIP GORDON WAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE 
ACCIDENT. 
The proximate cause of the accident and the result-
ing damage was the negligence of defendant Phillip 
Gordon which caused the vehicle he ,,~as driving to cross 
the center line and go onto the wrong side of the road 
and collide with the Johnson vehicle. 
The fact that a motorist is on the wrong side of the 
road at the time of a headon collision alone raises a 
presumption of negligence by the driver on the wrong 
side of the road. Wood 1./S. Strevell-Paterson Hardware 
Company, Supreme 'Court of Utah, 19'57l 313 P'ac. 2d 800; 
6 Utah 2d 340. There is no evidence in the record to 
overcome this presumption. The above case held that 
evidence that one driver was three feet over the center 
line was ample evidence to establish that the negligence 
of that driver was the proximate cause of the collision. 
In Xenakis, et al vs. Garrett Freight Lines, Inc., 
Supreme ,c·ourt of Utah, 1954, 265 P. 2d 1007; 1 Utah 
2d 299, the jury found that the Studebaker occupied by 
plaintiffs had crossed the center line into the wrong lane 
to collide with the defendants' truck. In affirming the 
judgment for the defendants the Supreme Court of Utah 
stated: "The defendant's truck having remained on its 
own side, there was no factor of negligence on the part 
of the defendant which, even if found to e:xist, would 
have contributed to the cause of the accident. If the 
Studebaker had kept on its right side ... the truck could 
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have proceeded safely down its own right side of the 
highway with brakes ever so faulty, or with none at all, 
without any collision occurring. 
"The fact that there was no negligence of the defend-
ant contributing as a proximate cause of the collision, 
leaves the Studebaker going over onto the wrong side as 
the sole proximate cause .... " 
POINT THREE. 
UNDER THE EVIDENCE THE NEGLIGENCE OF 
PHILLIP GORDON IS IMPUTABLE TO DEFENDANT NEIL 
GORDON. 
Neil Gordon gave his brother Phillip Gordon, an 
unlicensed driver, authority and direction to drive Neil 
Gordon's car to the place where Neil Gordon's girl friend 
lived and to drive her back to Salt Lake City to meet 
Neil Gordon. At the time of the accident Phillip Gordon 
as agent was doing on behalf of Neil Gordon exactly 
what he had been authorized to do by Neil Gordon, his 
principal. 
The presumption of agency from the mere· fact of 
ownership of an automobile imputes the driver's negli-
gence to the owner, and it then becomes the responsibility 
of the owner to show that the negligence should not be so 
imputed. Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah, 65, 102 Pac. 2d 493. 
Defendants gave no evidence whatsoever tending to rebut 
the presumption of agency which ariHPs frorn Phillip 
Gordon driving Neil Gordon's car. 
Agency is not lirnited to an employPP in a eomrnercial 
venture. A member of a family or a friend or acquain-
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tance who is gratitously perfor1ning an errand for the 
owner of a car may be the agent when acting within the 
authority of the car owner. 
In Cochran vs. Allyn, 16 Wise. 2d 20, 113 N.W. 2d 
538, defendant, who was in the hospital, asked his mother 
to drive defendant's car to their jointly owned cottage 
to shut off the water for the winter, and the mother, while 
driving to the cottage, was involved in an accident which 
injured plaintiff. It \Vas found that the mother-driver 
was acting as agent for the car owner. 
In Powels, et al vs. Ginsberg, 245 Wise. 45, 13 N.W. 
2d 448 (19'44) defendant's brother drove defendant in 
defendant's car to a restaurant to meet defendant's wife 
for lunch, and the defendants' brother in opening the 
door struck the plaintiff. Holding that the brother was 
the agent of the defendant car owner the court cited the 
R.estatement of Agency as follows : "Section 1 (1). 
A:gency is the relationship which results from the mani-
festation of consent by one person to another that the 
other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, 
and consent by the other so to act." 
In Nallie vs. Peters, et al, 241 N. Y. 177, 149 N.E. 
343, defendant-owner Peters asked a friend to take the 
plaintiff N allie on a pleasure ride. Owner-Peters was 
not in the car when the friend's driving resulted in 
dan1age to N allie. The court held that evidence tending 
to establish thP above 'vould support a finding of agency 
evl~n though the friend was to receive no coinpensation, 
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and the issue should be submitted to the jury. ·The court 
stated: 
"If Mondrone were driving Peters' car at his 
(P'eters') request on his (Peters') business or 
enterprise, acting in this particular as his servant 
or agent, Peters would be liable for his (Mon-
drone's) negligence. Whether or not he was to 
receive pay would merely be evidence bearing 
upon the question. Peters might be liable, even 
though Mondrone was to receive no compensation. 
Althorfe v. Wolfe} 22 N. Y. 355; Wyllie v. p,almerJ 
137 N. Y. 248, 33 N. E. 381, 19 L.R.A., 285. We 
think that there was evidence in this case from 
which the jury might find, or reasonably infer, 
that Mondrone was driving for the defendant, at 
his request, and for his benefit, that at the time 
of the accident he was engaged on the defendant's 
business or undertaking. Even one acting under 
such circumstances as a volunteer might render 
the owner of the car liable ... The liability for 
the acts of another is not dependent upon the 
strict relationship of master and servant, but 
upon relationship of similar natureJ when one 
acts for another, at his request, express or im-
plied, for his benefit, and under his directions. 
Under such circumstances, the negligence of the 
agent is the negligence of the master or the prin-
cipal. Lowell vs. Williams} 183 App. Div. 701, 170 
N.Y.S. 5·96; affirmed 228 N.Y. 59'2, 127 N.E. 916; 
Orlando v. Pioneer Barber Towel Supply Co., 2·39 
N. Y. 342, 146 N. E·. 621; Ferris v. Sterling} 214 
N.Y. 249, 108 N. E. 406, Ann. Cas. 1916-D 1161. 
:1: * *" ' 
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Dobson-P.eacock vs. Curtis, 166 Va. 550, 186, S.E. 13, 
held an owner who was not in the automobile at the time 
of the accident to he liable for the negligence of a grati-
tuous driver who was not paid for driving. 
In Cannon vs. Dupree (Tex.) 29-4 S.W. 298, the 
owner of a vehicle who was not riding in the vehicle at 
the time of the accident was held liable for the negligence 
of a friend who was gratituously operating the vehicle at 
the request of the owner. The court stated: 
"When Mr. ·T·aylor was directed and intrusted 
to drive the automobile on the remaining part of 
the contemplated journey to Rodger's Lake, as a 
substitute to relieve the . appellant, who had been 
driving, he for the time became her driver; and 
that he undertook to drive at her request can make 
no difference. When he was directed to assume, 
and was intrusted with, control of the automobile 
as a driver, he was, for all purposes of a driver, 
her representation as special servant in legal 
view; and if careless, and injury resulted to occu-
pants of the car, the owner vvas liable to the same 
extent as if he were the regularly employed 
driver. The driving was an act incident to service, 
and such special service was done by Mr. Taylor 
for the benefit of the owner of the automobile. 1 
L:abbott on Master and S·ervant, Sec. 22. As a 
general rule, authority may he conferred by one 
person upon another to do specially an act for 
him without any agreement to compensate him 
and without any binding undertaking on the part 
h •t " of such latter person to execute the aut or1 y. 
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See also Acosta v. Smith, La. App., 23 So. 2d 742, 
and Butter v. Smith, La. App., 23 So. 2d 745; Prickett v. 
Whapples, 10 ~Cal. App. 2d 701, 52 P. 2d 972; Rubin v. 
Schupp, 127 F. 2.d 6:25. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. ROYAL AND~RE·A.S~E~N 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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